WEEK-ENDSEMINAR OM NEVROPSYKOANALYSE MED OLIVER TURNBULL

av  Anders Zachrisson 

Instituttet arrangerte den 10. og 11. november 2006 et seminar om nevropsykoanalyse med Oliver Turnbull. Her presenteres det innlegg av Anders Zachrisson som åpnet diskusjonen efter Turnbulls forelesninger.

The early development of psychoanalysis was contemporaneous with the flourishing of the Vienna Circle where the philosophers Schlick and Carnap were central figures. Their epistemological perspective was the unity of sciences. This perspective said that, in principle, every science could be reduced to the underlying scientific field: sociology to psychology, psychology to neuro-physiology and all the way down to chemistry or nuclear physics. This was a grand, and presumptuous, project that failed because of the complexity the scientists met with. This complexity created enormous problems within their own fields, and optimism slackened concerning the possibilities of dealing with the same complexity at a more fundamental conceptual level (Zachrisson, 1998). However, this thinking also inspired Freud. In 1920 he wrote:

The deficiencies in our description would probably vanish if we were in a position to replace the psychological terms by physiological chemical ones. … They may be of a kind which will blow away the whole of our artificial structure of hypothesis (p. 60).

Also for psychoanalysis and neuro-physiology this reductionist scheme failed completely, one reason for this being the limited precision of neurological observations at that time.

Today the situation is changed. Neuroscience now has quite other methods of observation; more subtle and precise. In addition, the development of parts of the field, have moved in directions that make an approach more interesting for psychoanalysis.

            In key word form, I will underline three points that are important for the relation between neuro-physiology and psychoanalysis and the cooperation between the two fields.

            First, the neurological conception is now that the brain in many ways functions as a totality, and less so in isolated parts. This is isomorphic to the psychoanalytical conception of psychic life; a structure where everything reacts to everything else.

The second point is that emotions are given a central place in the neurological model of the brain’s functioning. This too is isomorphic with psychoanalysis. In psychoanalytic metapsychology in the last decades, emotions have moved into the very centre of the psychoanalytic model of personality. Now, they are not only phenomena that accompany drive life. Emotions are motivational forces in their own right.

            The third point of importance is the attitude of the neuroscientific approach to psychoanalysis. In contrast to the unity of science project with the aim to reduce psychology to neurology; this attitude is marked by an invitation to reciprocity and cooperation.

Neuro-physiology can offer methods of observation and conceptualisations that are less loaded with subjectivity than psychoanalysis can; and because of that, neuro-physiology can offer to psychoanalysis elements of external validation that we sorely need (both external correspondence and coherence). And connected to this is support from a system of knowledge that is fairly uncontroversial in academic science. Such a support is not easy conquered for psychoanalysis by its own force; mainly because of methodological problems to master the problem of subjectivity in observation and the problem of circularity in conceptualisation (Zachrisson & Zachrisson, 2005).

So, neuroscience can give both observational and conceptual support to psychoanalysis, for the present time restricted mainly to external point validations, i.e. specific neurological observations and concepts that confirm or coincide with analytical conceptualisations. It is extremely important for psychoanalysis to get such support, the more the better.

Now, this was promised to be a reciprocal endeavour. What can psychoanalysis offer to neuroscience?

            The neuropsychoanalytical project where Solms and Turnbull are active agents, has the ambition to investigate, in depth and in detail, the connections and the interactions between the brain and the inner world in man; between the material world of neurological functioning and the psychic world of mental functioning; in still other words, between neurological observations and concepts and the subjective phenomena described and conceptualised by psychoanalysis. And, according to these scientists, psychoanalysis offers the most elaborated and sophisticated theory at hand, of human subjectivity.

            So, psychoanalysis can provide neuroscience with concept formations (of man’s subjective life), proposing points and areas of investigation and ways of interpreting neurological observations.

Etter dette allmenne argument kommenterte Zachrisson enkelte begreper og momenter aktualisert av Turnbulls fremstilling. Det dreier seg dels om nevropsykologiske funn av direkte relevans for psykoanalytisk teoridannelse dels om at enkelte for psykoanalysen sentrale begreper ikke uten videre eller på noen enkel måte lar seg ”oversette” til nevropsykologiske undersøkelses­metoder.

Drive and emotion

Neuropsychological observations leave no doubt that the brain has activation systems corresponding to the “classical” psychoanalytical concept of drives. This is a memento for present day object relation theorizing.

The interplay between emotion and cognition is central for the psychoanalytic conceptualisation of mental functioning. This goes for creative processes, for intuition and for the working of defence mechanisms. This interplay was clearly demonstrated in the observations and experiments that Turnbull reported.

The quality of relations

In psychoanalytic theory, the quality of relations - with caregivers in infancy and childhood, with friends and mates later, with family members all the life – is of outmost importance. This includes the variations in warmth, predictability and stability of the relation, and affects quite a number of mental functions. Can these variations be subjected to neurophysiological investigation?

The motivational theory of psychoanalysis

The classical motivational conception was the seeking of pleasure and avoidance of unpleasure. However, already Fairbairn (1963) stated that man is not primarily pleasure seeking, but primarily seeking other human beings. Perhaps can the motivational theory of psychoanalysis be formulated thus: Pleasure is sought in its own right (fulfilment of needs of different kinds) and through relationships giving security, comfort, love, consolation a.s.o. The first part, the pleasure seeking part of the concept is closely associated with the drive concept and has strong support in neuropsychology. Can the second part, the relation seeking “drive”, be investigated?

Internalisation and transference

Internalisation is a crucial learning and developmental mechanism in mental life. Through internalisation, patterns of self-objects units with specific emotional colouring are established. These units function as building blocks in personality development. Transference can be looked upon as an expression of our way to learn from experience. By transference we activate and use old patterns for relating in new situations and to new persons. It seems that psychoanalysis can supplement its understanding of these processes by the new and quite specific knowledge about the neurological basis for memory functions that neuroscience supplies us with.

Psychic conflict and defence mechanisms

In the psychoanalytic theory of neurosis anxiety is the crucial emotion. It acts as a signal system for starting defensive means, which aims are to protect mental life from overwhelming anxiety. In several defence mechanism described by psychoanalysis, the interplay and balance between cognition and emotion is essential for the working of the defence. E.g. isolation is marked by repression of affect. The person sticks to cognition and isolates emotions from his ideation. In the “hysterical” repression we have the opposite situation. The hysteric is “sticking to affects” and excludes cognition from ideational life.

            Can the emotional/cognitive “balance” in the brain be registered in ways relevant for the psychoanalytic theory of defence mechanism? This question seems to be related to the possibility to distinguish, on neurological level, between experienced emotions and repressed emotions. And in the same line, can somatic displacement of affects (psychosomatic states) be distinguished on neurological level?  

Language and interpretation

In the psychoanalytic conception of human subjectivity, language is of immense importance. Language is a main structuring tool of consciousness. Human subjectivity is saturated with meaning – and meaning can only be reached by interpretation.

            So, let me end these reflections in a combined mood, in a combination of enthusiasm and sobriety. The line of research Turnbull has presented for us is really thrilling. And I am sure that it will be of central importance for the future of psychoanalysis as a science. At the same time we are wise, not to underscore the enigmatic nature of the mysterious leap between body and mind. This means to remember that neurological observations have to be interpreted psychoanalytically to be relevant for a psychoanalytic discourse.

REFERANSER

Fairbairn, WRD (1963). Synopsis of an object-relations Theory of the personality. Int J Psycho-Anal., 44: 224.225.

Freud, S (1920). Beyond the pleasure principle. S.E. XVIII.

Zachrisson, A (1998). Transference: polarities and paradoxes. Scand Psychoanal Rev, 21: 183-198.

Zachrisson, A & Zachrisson, HD (2005). Validation of psychoanalytic theories. Towards a conceptualisation of references. Int J Psychoanal, 86: 1353-71.